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ABSTRACT: A form of elitism undermines much writing on voter competence. The elitist 
move occurs when an author uses a self-serving worldview as the basis for evaluating 
voters. Such elitism is apparent in widely cited measures of “political knowledge” and in 
common claims about what voters should know. The elitist move typically limits the 
credibility and practical relevance of the analysis by leading writers to draw unreliable 
conclusions about voter competence. I propose a more constructive way of thinking about 
what voters know. Its chief virtue is its consistency with basic facts about the relationship 
between information and choice. 
 
Critical Review 18 (2006), Nos. 1-2. ISSN 0891-3811. www.criticalreview.com 
 
Arthur Lupia, Department of Political Science, 4252 Institute for Social Research, 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor MI 48109, thanks Robert Huckfeldt, Yanna 
Krupnikov, Adam Seth Levine, Jesse O. Menning, Jasjeet S. Sekhon, and Gisela Sin for 
advice on previous versions of this manuscript.
  
1
1
Many people write about voter (in)competence.  The topic is especially tempting after an 
author’s favored side loses an election or public-policy battle, for they can attribute their 
losses to voter ignorance (e.g., Herbert 2004). Other evaluations of voter competence 
arise when elections approach. These occasions prompt claims about “what informed 
voters ought to think about” when making political choices. Some of these claims are 
ideological in nature: they assert that a set of ideas with which they and their peer group 
agree should be privileged in political decision-making. One problem with such claims is 
that ideas in question need not be consistent with the self-interest of the voters who are 
being advised to become “informed” in a certain direction or consistent with the broader 
interests of the society in which these voters live. 
Other critiques of voter competence are more academic in nature. Many use data 
from election surveys administered by scholars. While most survey items query 
respondents’ opinions, others--“political knowledge” questions--yield responses that can 
be checked against documented facts. An example of such a question is: “Who is the 
Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court?” At almost all moments in the era of survey 
research that began after World War II, this question has had a discrete answer. At the 
time of this writing the answer is John Roberts.  
Many people do not give correct answers to standard “political knowledge” 
questions. Some respondents provide incorrect answers. Some say they “don’t know.” 
Others just don’t respond at all. Academic writers have used these responses to generate 
broad conclusions about voter competence. Stephen Earl Bennett (1988) and Ilya Somin 
(2004), for example, are among those who use political knowledge scales (the sum of the 
number of correct responses to these questions) to conclude “that about one-third of 
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respondents are ‘know nothings’ possessing little or no politically relevant knowledge” 
(Somin 2004, 8).  
In such conclusions, a form of elitism emerges. To see why such claims are elitist, 
ask yourself two questions. First, what benefit does a randomly selected citizen draw 
from knowing something like the name of the Chief Justice? Second, what benefit does 
society receive when a randomly selected individual can recite this fact? Before 
answering these questions, a moment of introspection may be instructive. I suspect that 
most of the people who will read this article are social scientists, journalists, lawyers, 
students, or other people with a deep interest in politics. In any of these roles, we have 
tasks to accomplish. For example, as a political-science professor at a major research 
university, I am expected to teach classes, to conduct research, and to mentor others. To 
accomplish these tasks, I must know certain things. Since I occasionally publish in law 
journals and often give lectures and conduct research on topics for which the Supreme 
Court is relevant, the name of the Chief Justice happens to be one of the things that it is 
beneficial for me to know. I would be embarrassed not to know it. Indeed, if I were 
revealed not to know such a thing in a public forum, my reputation might suffer. Given 
my impression of who will read this article, I suspect that something similar is true for 
you, the reader. And so it is for many “political knowledge” questions. Their answers are 
things that you and I are expected to know, given our occupations or interests. 
Such characteristics make us unrepresentative of the general population. We have 
unusual interests and obligations. It is not necessarily the case that the information that 
we feel that we must know has the same value to others.  
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In theory, those who write about voter competence might recognize the 
differences between their interests and the interests of the people whom they study. In 
practice, they tend to set these differences aside. Most political-knowledge questions are 
not derived from a replicable or transparent logic about how their answers bear on a 
voter’s ability to make decisions of a particular quality in the voting booth. Instead, the 
questions are generated by a worldview that is shared by a select set of academics, 
journalists, and politicos, but few others. Political-knowledge questions test information 
that academics, journalists, and politicos value. The answers to these questions help them 
accomplish important tasks. The elitist move is to assume that these questions have a 
similar value to citizens whose societal responsibilities can be very different than their 
own. When writers make this elitist move, they can switch from facilitating outcomes 
from which the voter or society will benefit to imposing on citizens a worldview whose 
relationship to such outcomes is speculative, at best.  
While writers are quick to categorize citizens as “ignorant” because they cannot 
answer typical political knowledge questions, they are slow to ask whether the questions 
themselves are part of the problem. Lest this judgment seem too harsh, it is worth 
pointing out that many of the questions now regularly used and cited by voter- 
competence writers are legacies of eras in which scholars knew far less about the 
relationship between information and choice than researchers know today (Lupia 2005b). 
If a goal of writing about voter competence is to increase the likelihood that voters make 
the same kinds of decisions they would have made if they had more information, then 
analysts should reconcile their claims with modern research on how various kinds of 
information relates to the quality of vote choices.  
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For the academic and popular literatures on voter competence, a change in 
practice is sorely needed. Measures of competence that correspond more closely to the 
kinds of decisions voters actually face can yield social benefit. But until voter-
competence writers improve their own skills in assessing others, they limit their ability to 
participate in the delivery of such benefits and may, in fact, be making matters worse. 
In what follows, I first evaluate common political-knowledge questions and 
scales. I find that these items reflect a worldview in which many journalists and political 
scientists have a valid professional interest. Less clear is whether individuals or societies 
are better off when the mass public spends time and effort learning how to act in 
accordance with this worldview (i.e., to learn the answers to common political-
knowledge questions). Next, I offer a strategy for developing voter-competence measures 
that are more consistent with basic facts about how information relates to choice. In each 
case, I contend that examinations of voter competence that are based less on elitist 
speculation about what voters should know will strengthen our collective ability to 
understand and improve voter competence. 
 
The Limited Value of Current Political-Knowledge Questions  
Most citizens spend very little time attending to the details of politics. This makes some 
analysts suspicious of what voters have in mind when they vote. Since analysts cannot 
observe voters' thoughts directly, they often turn to political-knowledge questions that are 
much like the quizzes administered in civics classes. They reveal who can respond 
correctly to inquiries such as "What is the political office currently held by Dick 
Cheney?" 
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Many citizens have a difficult time answering these questions. A 1996 book by 
Michael Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter provides a comprehensive study of the matter. It 
covers many decades and surveys. Analysts regularly use such data to conclude that 
voters are ignorant, unsophisticated, or incompetent. (Delli Carpini and Keeter draw a 
more nuanced conclusion, focusing on the differences between groups.) While such data 
may be useful for other purposes, their relevance to voter competence is quite limited.  
To see why, let’s define competence. I define competence as the ability to 
accomplish a task. If a person who knows facts X, Y, and Z can successfully accomplish 
task t, then it is conventional to call this person competent at t. This definition is a 
technical one, analogous to definitions used in research on expertise and competent 
performance in fields such as cognitive science and the study of artificial intelligence 
(see, e.g., Newell 1990).  
Given this definition, how should voter competence be measured? I will follow 
James H. Kuklinski and Paul J. Quirk’s framework: 
 
There are four principal conceptual components in any evaluation of  
performance. First, one must identify the task that the actor is asked to  
undertake. . . . Second, one must state a criterion by which the  
performance is to be evaluated – that is the property or attribute that  
is taken to constitute the quality of performance. Third, one must  
recognize at least one empirical indicator of that criterion. Finally,  
to categorize levels of performance, one must identify standards  
with respect to the indicator. Standards map levels of the indicator  
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onto a set of evaluative categories: satisfactory or unsatisfactory;  
very good, good, fair, poor and the like. (Kuklinski and Quirk  
2001, 287, emph. in original.) 
 
Here, I will examine the relationship between a voter’s ability to accomplish an 
electoral task and the ability to answer certain kinds of survey questions. To keep this 
essay compact, I will constrain my discussion to technical aspects of the relationship. For 
example, while I will examine indicators of whether a voter can cast a vote that satisfies a 
particular criterion (such as whether it is the same vote she would have cast if she had all 
relevant information available at the time of her choice), and while such criteria are 
inherently normative, I will not engage the underlying debate about whether the criterion 
I use for the purposes of example match some of the normative criteria for voting that 
others have proposed. Elsewhere, I address this complex debate in greater detail (Lupia 
2005b). 
 
Helpful vs. Necessary Political Knowledge 
In thinking about how to measure voter competence, it is crucial to distinguish between 
knowledge that may be helpful and knowledge that is necessary for competent task 
performance. To see how the two can be confused, consider the following problem. A 
voter knows a set of 26 facts that we can label A-Z. Suppose that knowing such facts 
allows the voter to accomplish a particular task, t, competently, where the task in 
question is to cast a vote for the option that best fits a set of normative requirements to 
which we have previously agreed. This information, A-Z, is sufficient for casting a 
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competent vote. But an important question for how we evaluate voter competence is, Is 
knowing A-Z necessary for a competent vote? 
To answer the question about necessity, we must ask whether there is a different 
set of facts, perhaps even a subset of facts A-Z, that also allows the voter to accomplish t? 
If the answer is no, then knowledge of every fact from A to Z is necessary for the voter to 
choose competently.  In such a case, we can assess the voter’s political competence 
reliably by quizzing her about A through Z--as with the political-knowledge tests on 
which so many analysts base their judgments of voter incompetence. If we find her 
deficient in her knowledge of even one of these facts, we can accurately judge her 
incompetent at task t. If we want to increase her competence at this task, moreover, we 
know that a precondition of success is providing her with the knowledge of all such facts 
about which the quiz reveals her ignorance. 
The problem with this approach to assessing voter competence is that it is validity 
depends on establishing that facts A-Z are necessary for competence: i.e., that knowledge 
of no subset of these facts, or alternative set of facts, would suffice for task t to be 
accomplished.  However, if facts other than the full set A-Z are sufficient for citizens to 
accomplish t, then knowing A-Z cannot be a necessary condition for competence at t. 
Thus, merely demonstrating that a voter does not know these facts may reveal little or 
nothing about her competence in the voting booth. 
Nevertheless, many contemporary analysts base many claims about voter 
incompetence not only on common political knowledge questions, but also on findings 
such as those of Philip E. Converse ([1964] 2006), who discovered that only 10 percent 
of the public could define the meaning of "liberal" or "conservative," and who had earlier 
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argued that an even smaller percentage of the public actually used such ideological 
categories in evaluating candidates and parties (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 
1960). Drawing broad conclusions about competence from either kind of evidence 
requires the premise that concepts such as “liberal” and “conservative” are necessary for 
voting competently (e.g., voting as one would if they had all available information). But I 
am not aware of any such evidence ever having been presented. While the ideological 
terms are helpful to some analysts, they need not be valuable to others. Indeed, if there 
are multiple informational pathways to a competent vote (e.g., interest- group 
endorsements, effective heuristics, etc., lead a voter to cast the same vote as she would 
have if better informed.), then voters need not use the same terms that political elites use.  
Voters can be ignorant of ideological terms or the Chief Justice’s name and still 
make competent choices in the voting booth. For voters, alternative terms, such as 
“Democrat” and “Republican,” or “liked by people I respect” and “disliked by people I 
respect,” can produce the same choices that voters would have made if they were walking 
political encyclopedias. Observing that survey respondents answer questions about 
ideological labels or common political knowledge incorrectly means nothing more, in 
itself, than that the respondents cannot (instantly) recall terms that political scientists and 
journalists know well. Broad claims about what such observations tell us about voter 
competence are of dubious credibility. 
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All Politics Is Not Federal 
When I first made such arguments to colleagues, I was assured that recent work 
established the validity of political-knowledge questions. And, indeed, there is work that 
claims to do this.  
Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996, 151-52; see also ibid., 329-33) follow previous 
researchers by using factor analysis to defend the assumption that "a scale with a limited 
number of factual items, if carefully constructed, can be used to approximate what 
citizens know more generally about politics." I agree that these statistics show that people 
who are good at answering some “political knowledge” questions tend to be good at 
answering other questions of the same ilk. It is not, however, clear that such tendencies 
imply anything about a voter's competence in the voting booth, or her political 
competence considered more generally. 
To see the problem with such claims, consider analogous debates about the 
measurement of intelligence. In The Mismeasure of Man, Stephen Jay Gould argues that 
intelligence cannot be meaningfully abstracted as a single number. In examining whether 
factor analysis supports the validity of such numbers, Gould (1996, 48) maintains that 
"the key error of factor analysis lies in reification, or the conversion of abstractions into 
putative real entities." In particular, he shows the flaws in attributing too much to the first 
principal component in a factor analysis--the same type of statistic upon which prominent 
"political-knowledge" scholars base their claim of validity: 
 
The first principal component is a mathematical abstraction that can  
be calculated for any matrix of correlation coefficients; it is not a  
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"thing" with physical reality. Factorists have often fallen prey to  
a temptation for reification - for awarding physical meaning to all  
strong principal components. Sometimes this is justified; I believe  
that I can make a good case for interpreting my first pelycosaurian  
axis as a size factor. But such a claim can never arise from the  
mathematics alone, only from additional knowledge of the physical  
nature of the measures themselves. For nonsensical systems of  
correlation have principal components as well, and they may resolve  
more information than meaningful components do in other systems.  
A factor analysis for a five-by-five correlation matrix of my age,  
the population of Mexico, the price of Swiss cheese, my pet turtles'  
weight, and the average distance between galaxies during the past  
ten years will yield a strong first principal component. This component 
--since all the correlations are so strongly positive--will probably  
resolve as high a percentage of information as the first axis in my study  
of pelycosaurs. It will also have no enlightening physical meaning whatsoever. 
(Ibid., 280.) 
 
The dependent variable being measured by political-knowledge scales--voter 
“competence”--is akin to the general “intelligence” of which Gould spoke. Its validity 
depends on "additional knowledge of the physical nature of the measures themselves." 
Gould’s challenge to users of political-knowledge scales is to locate, in the questions 
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themselves, a credible theory of information and choice that confers, upon the results of a 
factor analysis, any relevance that goes beyond simple reification.  
This means that it matters how political-knowledge questions are chosen.  To 
validate a scale, it must be compared to something that is itself considered a valid 
measure of the underlying concept. We would not, for example, claim that a political-
knowledge scale had been validated if we found that responses to these questions were 
highly correlated with shoe size, because shoe size is not considered a valid measure of 
political knowledge. Similarly, we should give weight to the factor-analytic finding of a 
correspondence among responses to political-knowledge questions only if at least some 
of those questions are themselves the consequence of a well-thought out, transparent, and 
replicable process that builds from sound analysis of what kind of knowledge is 
necessary for politically competent choices. 
So from what theoretical perspective do contemporary political-knowledge 
questions come? The answer is not encouraging. As Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996, 299) 
put it, "the selection of specific items remains fairly subjective, guided by the goals of the 
research and influenced by factors not easily quantified.”  
With this information in hand, the question becomes, “What are the goals and 
factors that produced the questions?” Elitism is a large part of the answer. To see how, 
note that political scholars and journalists who have reached the pinnacles of their 
respective fields tend to write for prestigious outlets with relatively large national 
audiences.  The lure of a national audience induces ambitious journalists and scholars to 
focus far more on presidential elections than local ones, far more on congresspersons than 
on state or local legislators, and far more on federal bureaucrats than their counterparts at 
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other levels of government. Without minimizing the importance of federal activities, it is 
important to recognize that they constitute but a handful of all of the politically relevant 
actions that occur on any given day.  
Randomly selected Americans are far more likely to be pivotal in political 
activities undertaken at the local, parish, or neighborhood levels than they are in any of 
the national-level activities on which many elite scholars and journalists are fixated. The 
political influence of most people is far more likely to be felt in decisions made closer to 
home. Perhaps the masses are more competent than commonly depicted because they 
realize that investing heavily in the minutiae of federal politics is akin to tilting at 
windmills.  
I know that this suggestion is provocative, but my hope is that it is constructively 
so. It will, perhaps, produce the objection, “Where would we be if everyone ignored the 
facts contained in standard political knowledge questions?” It is a good question. A 
democracy would be a farce if nobody knew basic facts about the operation or character 
of government. But it requires a grand leap of logic to go from this proposition to the 
conclusion that everyone, or even most people, ought to be able to answer a set of 
questions whose origins are “fairly subjective.”  
Consider, too, an alternative question: Where would we be if everyone knew these 
facts on which academics and journalists who write about voter competence dote? Would 
we be so much better off if every American could answer questions such as “Which 
political party is more conservative?” or “How long is the term of office for a United 
States senator?” on the spot during a survey interview?   
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Knowing such facts has not yet been demonstrated as necessary for competence at 
common voter tasks. Some scholars claim that such knowledge correlates with political 
knowledge, more broadly defined. Yet closer inspection reveals that the stated 
correlations either do not exist; that the correlations are real, but that they are correlations 
to other political- knowledge questions of “fairly subjective” origin; or that the 
correlations are to variables such as voter registration and turnout, which are important 
politically, but are not widely accepted as a valid measures of what people know.  
When scholars criticize the mass public for its inability to answer common 
political-information questions, then, they are basically condemning others for not 
sharing their federal fixation. This is not to say that elite scholars (and their counterparts 
in the media) are wrong to have such a fixation. Journalists who work for, or aspire to 
work for, the nation’s most influential news outlets must ultimately learn to produce 
stories that can be relevant to a national audience. Similarly, the leading political-science 
journals serve national and international clienteles. Articles that end up in a journal of 
only local or regional interest tend not to advance the careers of political scientists as 
much as do articles of national interest.  
But most citizens are neither political scientists nor journalists. Perhaps they do 
not concentrate on the political categories dear to elites because they have figured out that 
they can’t do very much with such concepts, given the very limited opportunities they 
have to influence national policy. There are substantial differences between the tasks that 
most voters are asked to perform and the tasks that national journalists and political 
scientists are asked to perform. Elite attempts to assess voter competence should take 
these differences into account. 
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The Sufficiency of Proxies and the Superfluousness of More 
There is a different way of assessing voter competence, one that starts with understanding 
the difference between knowledge that is necessary for competence at socially-valuable 
tasks and knowledge that is merely helpful to political elites but perhaps of limited use to 
others.   
Two crucial aspects of this understanding are that many kinds of information can 
lead a voter to reach the same conclusion; and that we should evaluate a voter as 
competent regardless of how she reaches a conclusion, as long as it is the conclusion she 
would have reached had she been aware of the best available information.  It is her 
performance that counts, and there can be many informational paths to success. A voter 
may not need to remember everything she has heard about the topic (see, e.g., the 
discussion of online processing of political information in Lodge and Taber 2000). 
Moreover, she need not even have been exposed to, let alone carefully thought about, 
every available piece of information. For her, a subset of available information may 
suffice (Popkin 1991). And if the information on which she acts suffices, additional 
information is not necessary to increase her competence with respect to this task.  
For many choices, the amount of information that can be sufficient to cast a 
competent vote is limited by a voter’s range of choices. Consider, for example, the case 
where a voter is asked to endorse or reject a referendum. In such cases, voters are not 
allowed to draft amendments. They are not allowed to approve only parts of a 
referendum. They are restricted to a simple yes or no response. Even if a ballot measure 
is very technical, the voter’s choice is either the measure or the status quo. Once one has 
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information sufficient to distinguish which of these two alternatives is “better,” it is 
impossible for additional information to be necessary to cast a competent vote.  
The number of ways that a voter can make a competent inference determines 
whether any particular fact is necessary for competence. If there is one and only one fact 
that will allow a voter to make a correct determination about whether the referendum is 
better or worse than the status quo, then the fact is necessary. In many cases, however, 
there is more than one such fact. Interest groups, politicians, newspapers, and other 
public entities often offer public endorsements of particular ballot measures, any one of 
which may suffice as a proxy for detailed knowledge. Consider, for example, a 
referendum on gun control that both one’s local newspaper and the National Rifle 
Association (NRA) oppose. For people who know that their stance on all such issues 
parallels that of the newspaper or the NRA, either endorsement can serve as an effective 
substitute for information such as the actual text of the referendum. It can lead them to 
cast exactly the same vote. In the same way that drivers use the trajectory of oncoming 
headlights to draw accurate inferences about the future locations of other cars, and 
consumers use brand names to draw accurate inferences about particular qualities of 
many consumer goods, citizens can use endorsements to draw accurate inferences about 
important attributes of political phenomena.  
Such proxies are not just present in referendums. Voters’ continuing reliance on 
proxies such as party labels plays a similar role in candidate-based elections. In almost 
every aspect of our lives, we use proxies such as brand names, the advice of others, and 
regularities of nature to come to quick--and often reliable--conclusions about the 
consequences of our actions.  It is no more reasonable to expect voters to have detailed 
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knowledge of political matters where such proxies are available as it would be to expect 
Mercedes buyers to have an auto mechanic’s understanding of exactly how Daimler-
Chrysler produces cars that perform well. Even professional legislators regularly use 
endorsements from their research staff and party leaders as substitutes for reading every 
word of every proposed law themselves. When citizens can use endorsements to cast the 
same vote that they would have cast if they had better information, the finding that 
citizens cannot recall minute legislative details is irrelevant. Instead, we should ask: 
“What proxies suffice for competent voting?”  
 Scholars who offer blanket criticisms of the quality of heuristic decision making 
often overlook the notion of sufficient information. An endorsement offered by a 
newspaper, the NRA, or the Democratic party means nothing in isolation, but if people 
can use such knowledge (i.e., prior knowledge of the NRA or the newspaper’s political 
stances) to draw correct inferences about the implications of such endorsements for their 
own political choices, such an endorsement can suffice for competent decision making.  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  insert Figure 1 about here 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Figure 1 depicts the kind of information needed for the voter to make a reliable 
inference in such cases. One side of the triangle is the relationship between the chooser 
and the endorsement (proxy). The second side is the relationship between the proxy and 
the choice. The third side is the relationship between the chooser and the choice. The 
proxy can be necessary for the person’s competence (i.e., it is necessary if the chooser is 
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to make a reliable assessment of the triangle’s third side) only if they are incompetent 
initially.  The proxy is sufficient if the chooser has enough information about the first two 
sides of the triangle.  This includes information about the relationship between the 
chooser and the endorser, in the case of that type of proxy; as well as information the 
relationship between the endorser and the consequence of the choice. An endorsement 
from a complete stranger is not typically sufficient because the person is uncertain about 
the stranger’s motives and knowledge. Similarly, an endorsement from someone you 
know is less likely to be helpful if you don’t know her relationship to the issue about 
which you are to make a choice. The endorser may, for example, be ignorant of the 
consequence of your choice. If, however, you know that the endorser shares your 
interests with regard to the issue and is knowledgeable about its consequences for you, 
then a triangular operation of the form “If she is voting for X, then I should too” can 
induce an otherwise incompetent voter to cast the same vote she would have cast if she 
had, say, the most accurate available information about its consequences. How much 
information is required depends in large part on the circumstances in which the choice is 
made. The conditions under which voters can use endorsements to cast competent votes 
are easier to satisfy when circumstances clarify an endorser’s knowledge and incentives 
for revealing what they know truthfully (Lupia and McCubbins 1998). The impact of any 
particular proxy will also be a function of what the voter already knows. As Converse 
(1975: 97) recognized, “the richness and meaning of new information depends vitally on 
the amount of past information one brings to the new message.” 
Such dynamics imply that a proxy that is sufficient for one person to vote 
competently need not be sufficient for another. They also imply that different kinds of 
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tasks require different kinds of proxies. Such nuances continue to elude writers who make 
grand proclamations about voter incompetence or, in particular, the universal inadequacy 
of heuristic (proxy-based) decision making. The right question to ask is not whether 
heuristics always (or never) yield competent decisions, because we know that the answer 
is no. The right question to ask is about the conditions under which use of particular 
proxies is necessary or sufficient for competent voting. When the literature shifts its 
emphasis accordingly, it will be on a more credible footing for understanding voter 
competence and helping to improve it. 
I close with a description of conditions under which certain kinds of proxies can 
aid voter competence. As the kinds of proxies that are most effective vary by electoral 
context, so do the kinds of survey questions needed to assess competence in that context. 
The simplest kind of decision is a single binary choice. In such cases, a proxy simply 
needs to convey which of the two options is better.  
What about more complex decisions? Suppose, for example, one wants to label a 
voter competent only if they make competent choices in every one of a large number of 
referendums and/or two-candidate elections.  If competence is measured with respect to a 
voter’s performance in N elections, then there are 2N possible choices.  For two elections, 
the first posing a choice between candidates a and b and the second being between 
candidates c and d, the voter can make four possible decisions: vote for a and c, a and d, b 
and c, or b and d. When the basis of the evaluation is 20 two-candidate elections, then the 
number of choices is 1,048,576. For 30 elections, there are over a billion possible 
combinations of votes to cast. 
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If one wants to judge a voter’s competence by her performance in all of 20 or 30 
elections, the number of options just described might make it seem extremely unlikely 
that competence can be obtained – particularly by people who pay little attention to 
politics. It may also be that a person’s inability to answer standard political-knowledge 
questions is sufficient for us to conclude that she is incapable of accomplishing such a 
complex task. The presence of proxies, however, should caution us against reaching 
either conclusion prematurely. 
Numerous studies of American politics show that a candidate’s partisan 
identification is a powerful force not only in her electoral fortunes, but also in her likely 
legislative activities. To the extent that a voter, if very well informed, would always 
choose a particular kind of candidate across all elections, and to the extent that such 
choices correspond well to partisan proxies, party cues can engender competent 
performance even in the complex situations described above. If voting Democratic is the 
best choice a particular voter can make at any level of government, then simply knowing 
who the Democrat, and voting accordingly, yields the same outcome as would 
encyclopedic knowledge of all of the candidates. In the 30 election case, we could say 
that she chose competently even though she had over a billion options from which to 
choose. And if the proxy is indeed sufficient for competent performance, evidence that 
this voter is uninformed or misinformed about some minute detail of a candidate’s 
background or activities need not imply that the voter will vote for the wrong candidate. 
That proxies exist does not ensure their competent use. People must know enough 
to apply the proxy effectively. Moreover, when relatively simple proxies such as party 
identification are applied to complex problems, such as voting competently in a string of 
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20 to 30 elections, the proxies must, paraphrasing Paul Sniderman (2000, 74), “cut nature 
at its joints.” In the case of two-candidate elections, where one candidate is a Republican 
and the other is a Democrat and the proxy links the party label to particular political 
outcomes in the way that complete information would, the proxy can suffice. But as the 
situation diverges from that description, relying on the simple binary proxy is more 
hazardous.  The binary proxy “Democrat,” for example, is not helpful in distinguishing 
among the candidates in a Democratic primary, and may be of limited help in an electoral 
context with three or more viable parties.  In the extreme, where partisan cues provide no 
reliable information about what the voter would choose if she were very well informed, 
evidence that the voter knows a candidate’s party identification offers no evidence about 
her competence (although it should be said that such a circumstance does not increase the 
reliability of conventional political knowledge questions for assessing civic competence; 
they may too be completely uninformative). 
That proxies can allow people with limited information to vote competently does 
not imply that ignorance is desirable, but it does imply that concrete progress in assessing 
and improving political competence can come from more realistic standards than “the 
fully-informed voter.” In the elections upon which voter-competence writers focus most 
often, “the fully informed voter” is sheer fantasy. Indeed, for most large-scale elections 
there are two kinds of people: those who realize that they do not know all the relevant 
facts and those who are deluded enough to think that they do. We cannot know 
everything about most of the political phenomena we encounter.  
Even if “all the facts” could be delivered to citizens, questions would remain 
about the social value of doing so, for there are many kinds of information on which most 
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citizens cannot act. What matters more is the conditions under which they can make 
effective choices about what information to attend to (Lupia and McCubbins 1998). This 
idea is key to generating assessments of competence that are more useful to the voters 
being evaluated and more valuable to the societies of which they are a part. 
  
   *   *   * 
 
In everyday life, people base choices not on all of the information they encounter, 
but on a select subset of it. So even if we could convey “all the facts” to a voter, they 
would have to process the information and, in the end, some of the facts would turn out to 
be irrelevant to their decisions. If it is costly to acquire information and if it requires 
effort to process and remember it, then knowing everything is superfluous, at best.  
What you need to know depends on what you have to do. Different citizens have 
different civic responsibilities. Those citizens who have greater civic ambitions should 
perhaps know more than those who want merely to vote. Societies do well to invest in 
their futures and offering civic information to real and potential leaders is important. 
However, such business is too important to be the product of a narrow worldview. In a 
mass democracy, it is too important to be based on elitist assumptions.  
It is also worth remembering that the more we demand of people, the less freedom 
they have, and freedom is among the most valuable products that democratic societies 
can produce. It is imperative, therefore, to join the emphasis on well-informed citizens 
with realistic evaluations of whether the sacrifices that being well informed entail 
generate tangible benefits. Voter-competence reformers should minimize the burden on 
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citizens whenever possible. Among these burdens are the psychic cost of inadequacy and 
the social cost of withdrawal when people falsely believe that they have nothing to 
contribute to civic life because they are comparing themselves to the unrealistic icon of 
the perfectly informed citizen. 
Unless competent performance requires that the task be performed in a particular 
way, society does not benefit from attempts to regulate how people approach the task. If 
one person achieves competence in ways that are foreign or unfamiliar to another, and if 
the unfamiliar way of performing the task does not hurt anyone else, then the person in 
question should be free to choose that way. She should not have to alter her practices 
because they do not fit an elitist worldview. Until critics can offer a transparent, credible, 
and replicable explanation of why a particular set of facts is necessary for a particular set 
of socially valuable outcomes, they should remain humble when assessing the 
competence of others. 
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